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This Note examines the doctrine of inherency in patent law, which
relates to the Patent Act’s novelty requirement, and—theoretically—
seeks to ensure that inventions that are already within the public
domain are not wrenched away from the public through a later patent
grant. Unfortunately, a lack of recent Supreme Court guidance and a
conflict within the Federal Circuit concerning what is necessary to
prove inherency have led to a confusing and unpredictable body of
inherency law. This Note begins by outlining the increased concern for
uniformity and predictability in patent law; it then traces the early
treatment of inherent anticipation by the Supreme Court, as well as the
Federal Circuit and its predecessor court. Next, it argues that the
Federal Circuit’s more recent inherency jurisprudence has expanded
the scope of inherency, particularly with respect to patents covering
pharmaceuticals, introducing dangerous and costly unpredictability
into the patent system. Finally, it proposes a common-sense solution
aimed at abrogating the current boundless conception of inherency in
order to allow patent law and inherency to perform their central
functions: to provide predictability and ensure the important patent
policy of rewarding new inventions that are not already within the
public domain.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of uniform application of the law can hardly be
contested in any context. Patent law is no exception. In fact,
legislative history demonstrates a heightened concern for consistent,
predictable application of the law in the context of patents.1
Uniformity creates predictability, and predictability in turn provides
inventors with the ability to prudently invest in research and
development.2 However, the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions
concerning the doctrine of inherent anticipation represent a troubling
expansion of the doctrine that injects new and costly uncertainty into
the patent system.3
Inherent anticipation is an admittedly difficult concept, even for
the most skilled patent attorneys.4 It relates to the statutory
requirement that an invention be novel—that is, something
undisclosed to the public.5 When an invention or a written
description of an invention predates the invention on which a patent
application is filed, the prior invention or disclosure is deemed “prior
art.”6 If a prior art reference published more than one year before the

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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1. Federal patent law and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit were created to
promote fair, uniform, and predictable application of patent law. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To
Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1787–1836 (Part
I), 79 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61, 65 (1997) (discussing the constitutional framers’
decision to create federal patent law in light of the inevitable conflict that would be created by
allowing different patent laws to the promulgated by the states; Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1985) (merging the Court of Claims and Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals to form the Federal Circuit). See also H.R. REP. NO. 97-312 at
20–22 (1981) (arguing in favor of creating the Federal Circuit in order to combat the effects of
“pro-patent” and “anti-patent” jurisdictions); Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial
Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 685 (1993) (asserting Congress created
the Federal Circuit to allow for “consistent application of the law . . . [which] would have a direct
and salutary effect on industrial innovation, and thereby on the nation’s technological strength
and international competitiveness”).
2. See Newman supra note 1, at 685.
3. See, e.g., In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
4. Id. at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (“Inherency is a very tricky concept in patent law.”).
5. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“A patent claim is not valid if ‘the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this . . . country . . . more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States.’” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000))).
6. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1377–78 (majority opinion) (discussing prior art
references and their interaction with the underlying patent claims at issue).
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7. See SmithKline Beecham Corp., 403 F.3d at 1342. Section 102(b) is sometimes referred
to as the “statutory bar,” as distinguished from § 102(a), the “novelty” requirement. See
EZ Dock v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing the
“statutory bars”). Congress recently amended the Patent Act by adopting the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (the AIA). See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2011); H.R. REP. NO. 112-1249
(2011). The AIA represents a massive shift in the way U.S. patents are granted under § 102(a),
but does not appear to meaningfully change the operation of § 102(b) as it relates to inherent
anticipation. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b). For further reading on the AIA, see Jason Rantanen &
Lee Petherbridge, Ph.D., Toward A System of Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24 (2011).
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
9. See id.
10. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (“Inherency is a very
tricky concept in patent law.”).
11. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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effective filing date of a patent application contains all of the same
claims as the later patent application, the prior art is said to
“anticipate” the claims.7 Anticipation negates novelty, and therefore
no patent can issue on anticipated subject matter.8
For example, if a professor of pharmacology publishes a 2010
dissertation disclosing that administration of captopril, an
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor, to patients at risk for stroke
effectively reduces the patient’s risk of stroke, that dissertation is
deemed prior art with respect to any subsequent patent applications
pertaining to the administration of captopril to stroke-prone patients.
Accordingly, if an inventor files a patent application in 2012
claiming administration of captopril to stroke-prone patients for the
treatment or prevention of stroke, the claims are anticipated by the
prior art dissertation and therefore invalid. Once the professor made
the 2010 disclosure, the use of captopril for the treatment of stroke
became part of the public domain; it follows that any later claims to
the same use of captopril should be denied.9
Unfortunately, anticipation often becomes more convoluted than
this example suggests. The anticipation analysis becomes
considerably less clear when the prior art does not expressly disclose
all of the claims of the subsequent invention.10 Even when a prior art
disclosure does not expressly disclose all the claim limitations of a
later invention, but performance of the method described in the prior
art necessarily contains the undisclosed characteristics, the prior art
still negates novelty because the undisclosed results are said to be
“inherent” in the prior art.11 Properly understood, inherent

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 181 Side A

09/23/2014 13:40:53

UNBOUND CONCEPTION OF INHERENCY

Fall 2013]

9/10/2014 6:48 PM

UNBOUNDED CONCEPTION OF INHERENCY

349

C M
Y K

09/23/2014 13:40:53

12. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
13. E.g., id.; Schering, 339 F.3d 1373.
14. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was the Federal Circuit’s predecessor
court. See Newman, supra note 1, at 685.
15. 677 F.3d 1375.
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anticipation serves as a gatekeeper, ensuring the important patent
policy of promoting disclosure and only rewarding new inventions
that are not already within the public domain.12 However, the Federal
Circuit’s recent case law on inherent anticipation13 has produced a
boundless conception of inherency that calls into question the
doctrine’s fundamental purpose, casts a cloud of uncertainty over
patent law, and threatens to undermine the vitality of the
pharmaceutical industry, one of the most important industries in
modern society.
This Note argues that the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions
disregard decades of precedent on inherency, thereby creating an
unbounded doctrine that not only fails to provide adequate
predictability for inventors but also undermines the policy germane
to inherency, and to patent law in general. Part II begins by
examining the general framework of patentability and the historical
policy considerations that have come to shape the Patent Act today.
It then focuses on the early history of inherency through a series of
Supreme Court and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals14 cases,
and argues that inevitability was always the driving force in
inherency. Finally, it inspects the Federal Circuit’s more recent,
conflicting case law on recognition and inevitability.
Part III begins by analyzing the Federal Circuit’s recent
discordant approach to inherency. It highlights the lack of
predictability in inherency over the last two decades, before focusing
on the Federal Circuit’s recent inherency decision in In re
Montgomery,15 in which the court called into question the meaning
of inevitability, and therefore the scope and predictability of
inherency generally. Part III then addresses the disconnect between
the public policy underlying inherency and the use of bright line
rules intended to promote the policy. The problematic nature of
bright line rules in patent law is demonstrated by reference to another
area of patent law—the requirement that a patented invention be
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nonobvious—in which the Supreme Court rejected the Federal
Circuit’s similar use of rigid, bright line rules.
Part IV sets forth a proposal that seeks to restore predictability
to inherency by aligning the inherency analysis directly with the
patent policy it seeks to promote. Finally, Part V concludes by
reiterating the seriousness of the predictability problem in inherent
anticipation, and calls for the appropriate institutional response.
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16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. See W.S. Holdsworth, The Common Debates 1621, 52 L. Q. REV. 481, 487 (1936)
(discussing King James I’s granting of odius monopolies); Walterscheid, supra note 1, at 65.
20. See Walterscheid, supra note 1, at 76.
21. See Holdsworth, supra note 19, at 487; Walterscheid, supra note 1, at 76;.
22. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2000); see also Newman, supra note 1, at 685
(discussing Congress’s creation of the Federal Circuit to promote uniformity in patent law).
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II. BACKGROUND
Congress has the power to grant patents under Article I, Section
8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, commonly referred to as the
Progress Clause.16 This clause is particularly unique, in that it
describes the only enumerated power to set forth the specific means
of exercising that power.17 It states that Congress shall have the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”18 This limited
grant is the result of a balancing of two critical concerns.19 On one
hand, the framers wanted to promote scientific and technological
invention, and thought patents were an effective means of carrying
out such an endeavor.20 On the other hand, the framers were no doubt
aware of the history of monopolistic abuses in England and thus
wanted to ensure that patents were only granted on subject matter
that actually advanced society by improving the arts and sciences.21
Thus, over time Congress has developed patentability requirements
to ensure that issued patents do, indeed, “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.”22
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A. Patentability
In order for a patent to issue, the applicant must prove, among
other things, that his or her invention is novel, useful, and
nonobvious.23 The applicant must also disclose his or her method of
making and using an invention in a manner sufficient to allow a
person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention to make and use
it.24 With only minor exceptions, the patentee’s disclosure of what
constitutes his or her invention is the fundamental basis of U.S.
patent protection.25 That is, a patentee is entitled to enforce his or her
patent only against unauthorized uses that encompass the patent
application’s claims, and insufficient disclosure is a ground for
invalidating patent claims.26
Put another way, the inventor’s disclosure in the patent
application is the quid, and the twenty-year right to exclusive use is
the quo. Without adequate disclosure, there is no quid pro quo; the
public does not receive anything—or at least not enough—in
exchange for the limited-term monopoly that is provided to the
patentee.27 The novelty and disclosure requirements thus ensure that
patents are issued on a limited set of inventions, and that the public
and other PHOSITAs28 reap the benefits of the patented invention.29
The framers were concerned not only with striking this balance
but also with predictability.30 The Articles of Confederation
contained no provisions for federal patent protection, effectively

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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23. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103.
24. See id. § 112.
25. See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding that it is only what the inventor “claims” in his or her invention that is protected).
26. See id. In addition, 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3) sets forth failure to comply with any § 112
disclosure requirement as an affirmative defense to infringement.
27. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 433–34 (1822) (arguing that the § 112 disclosures serve
two goals: (1) to enable an artisan to make and use the invention; and (2) to put the public in
possession of what the patentee claims as his own invention, “so as to ascertain if he claim
anything that is in common use, or is already known, and to guard against prejudice or injury
from the use of an invention which the party may otherwise innocently suppose not to be
patented”).
28. A person having ordinary skill in the art is commonly referred to by the acronym
“PHOSITA.”
29. Evans, 20 U.S. at 435.
30. See Walterschied, supra note 1, at 66 (discussing the constitutional framers’ decision to
create federal patent law in light of the inevitable conflict that would be created by allowing
different patent laws to be promulgated by the states, as was allowed in the Articles of
Confederation).
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leaving patent protection to the individual states.31 Concerned over
the inevitable conflict that would result from state patent protection,
the framers later included the Progress Clause in the U.S.
Constitution.32
More recently, Congress has shown additional concern over
uniformity and predictability in patent law.33 Its decision to create
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was motivated, at least
in part, by concerns over inconsistent approaches of the regional
circuits and the inevitable forum-shopping that resulted.34 Thus, the
Progress Clause, which gives birth to the Patent Act itself, along with
the appellate court designed to oversee patent law make clear that
predictability is central to the U.S. patent system.35
B. Inherent Anticipation
The novelty requirement ensures that patents are only granted
where an applicant contributes something new to society—thus
striking a balance between affording patent protections to inventors
and protecting the public from unreasonable expenses.36 To that end,
if an invention was previously patented or described in a printed
publication more than one year before the inventor files his or her
patent application, the invention is said to be “anticipated” by the
“prior art.”37 Anticipation negates novelty under § 102, and thus no
patent can issue on anticipated subject matter.38

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–22 (1981) (arguing in favor of creating the Federal
Circuit in order to combat the effects of “pro-patent” and “anti-patent” jurisdictions); Newman,
supra note 1, at 685 (asserting Congress created the Federal Circuit to allow for “consistent
application of the law”).
34. Newman, supra note 1, at 685.
35. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–22 (1981); Walterschied, supra note 1, at 66.
36. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Lourie, J., dissenting)
(explaining that inherency’s “salutary goal is to prevent subject matter that is effectively in the
public's possession from being retrieved by a patent and withdrawn from the public domain”).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 102 states, “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention
was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country . . . more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.” Section 102(b) is
sometimes referred to as the “statutory bar” as opposed to § 102(a), which is deemed the “true
novelty” requirement; however, the anticipation analysis is the same under both sections. See 35
U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2000).
38. Id. See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980) (stating that a core
concept of patent law is that anticipation undermines patentability).
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Anticipation involves a two-step analysis.39 The first step
requires construction of the claims at issue.40 Claim construction is a
question of law in which the court gives the claims in question their
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the patent
specifications.41 Once claim construction is complete, the second
step of the anticipation analysis involves comparing the claims in
question to the prior art.42 Ordinarily, a single prior art reference
anticipates a patent claim when it expressly discloses every claim
limitation.43 However, the public can gain more from prior art than
what is expressly disclosed. Thus, even where a single prior art
reference does not expressly disclose all the limitations of the
claimed invention, it may still anticipate inherently “if [the] missing
characteristic[s] [are] necessarily present, or inherent, in the single
anticipating reference.”44
Inherent anticipation is admittedly a tricky concept—it has
puzzled judges, lawyers, inventors, and jurors for decades.45
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, along with
its predecessor courts, have long agreed that a given characteristic
could only anticipate inherently if it necessarily exists within a single
prior art reference.46 In 1991, the Federal Circuit held that
anticipation required not only that the undisclosed characteristics be
inherent, but also that the missing characteristics be recognized by a
person having ordinary skill in the art.47 This change in the law was
short lived. Recent panel decisions have rejected the recognition

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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39. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1379.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1380–81.
42. Id.
43. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
44. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citing Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). See
also In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[P]rior art [must]
necessarily function[] in accordance with, or include[], the claimed limitations.”).
45. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (“Inherency is a very
tricky concept in patent law.”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 371, 372 (2005); Newman, supra note 1, at 685 (discussing the numerous concepts in patent
law that puzzle jurors, judges, and lawyers alike).
46. E.g., Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 639 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981)); Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212,
214 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
47. See Cont’l Can, 948 F.2d at 1268.
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requirement and held that anticipation requires only that the
undisclosed characteristics inevitably flow from the single prior art
reference and that the prior art enable a PHOSITA to practice the
later claimed invention.48 Although the clash over recognition was
short lived, it caused intra-circuit conflict and continues to cast a
cloud of confusion over inherency.49

C M
Y K
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48. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Atlas
Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In this context, enablement—or
an enabling disclosure—means that thedisclosure was sufficient to allow a PHOSITA to practice
the claimed invention.
49. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); id. at 995–96 (Lourie, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling
Patent Law's Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1132 (2008); Alfredo De
La Rosa, A Hard Pill to Swallow: Does Schering v. Geneva Endanger Innovation Within the
Pharmaceutical Industry?, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 37 (2007).
50. 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
51. Id. at 709.
52. Id. at 711.
53. Id.
54. 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
55. Id. at 65.
56. Id. at 66–67.

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 183 Side B

1. Tilghman, Eibel, and Other Early Inherency Cases
Inherency is often traced back to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Tilghman v. Proctor.50 There, the patent in question claimed a
method of forming fatty acids and glycerin by heating fats with water
at high pressure.51 The prior art involved animal fat employed to
lubricate pistons of steam engines, which might have produced fatty
acids.52 The Court held that even if fatty acids were produced in the
prior art, the prior art would not anticipate, because a PHOSITA
“certainly never derived the least hint from this accidental
phenomenon in regard to any practicable process for manufacturing
such acids.”53
Another early Supreme Court anticipation case is Eibel Process
Company v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Company.54 Eibel’s claims
involved a papermaking machine that employed paper-forming mesh
with an elevated pitch that improved the quality of the resulting
paper.55 Some prior art papermaking machines appeared to have
employed pitched mesh, but not to the same degree as Eibel’s
invention, and only for drainage.56 Citing Tilghman, the Court held
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the prior art did not anticipate the new papermaking machines
because,
[i]n the first place, we find no evidence that any pitch of the
wire, used before Eibel, had brought about such a result as
that sought by him, and in the second place if it had done so
under unusual conditions, accidental results, not intended
and not appreciated, do not constitute anticipation.57
The Federal Circuit’s predecessor patent court—the CCPA—
adopted the reasoning of Tilghman and Eibel, at least insofar as those
cases held inherency requires inevitability.58 For example, in the
1964 case In re Seaborg,59 the CCPA considered claims drawn to an
isotope of americium, made by nuclear reaction.60 A prior art patent
disclosed a similar nuclear reaction process, but did not disclose the
claimed isotope.61 The court held the prior art process did not
anticipate the claims because the isotope, “if it was produced in the
[prior art] process, was produced in such minuscule amounts and
under such conditions that its presence was undetectable.”62 Seaborg
makes clear that the mere fact that a certain thing might result from a
given set of circumstances is insufficient to support a finding of
inherency.63
It is important to note, however, that Seaborg contains no
express language whatsoever regarding recognition.64 In fact, even as
early as 1939 in Hansgirg v. Kemmer,65 the CCPA seemed only to

09/23/2014 13:40:53

C M
Y K

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 184 Side A

57. Id. at 66 (citing Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711).
58. See, e.g., In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Marshall, 578 F.2d 301
(C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Felton, 484 F.2d 495 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996
(C.C.P.A. 1964).
59. 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
60. Id. at 996. Americium (Am) is element 95 on the periodic table. Id. It may strike some
readers as strange that an element on the periodic table can be patented. A naturally occurring
mineral, such as iron, even if newly discovered, cannot be patented because such subject matter is
deemed patent ineligible. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“[A] new
mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject
matter.”). However, americium is a “man made” radioactive isotope that does not exist in nature,
which means it is not subject matter ineligible. See, e.g., id. at 310 (explaining that the patentee’s
modified bacteria had “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature” and was “not
nature's handiwork, but his own,” thus rendering it patentable subject matter).
61. In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d at 996–97.
62. Id. at 998–99.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
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focus on inevitability and enablement.66 In Hansgirg, the court held
inherency requires “that the natural [i.e., inevitable] result flowing
from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the
questioned function.”67 The court’s emphasis on “as taught” is
important: it did not hold that a PHOSITA needed to apprehend the
undisclosed result; rather, it required that the prior art “teach”—that
is, enable one of ordinary skill to carry out—an operation that would
inevitably produce the undisclosed result.68 However, in the 1991
case of Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,69 the
Federal Circuit held otherwise.70
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66. See id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
70. Id. at 1268 (“To serve as an anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted
inherent characteristic, such gap in the reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic
evidence. Such evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily
present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of
ordinary skill.” (emphasis added)).
71. Id.
72. See In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (applying the anticipation
analysis from Continental Can).
73. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1347.
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2. Continental Can and the Short-Lived
Per Se Recognition Requirement
Judge Newman, writing for a unanimous panel in Continental
Can, explained that inherent anticipation required that the pertinent
evidence “make clear that the missing descriptive matter is
necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it
would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.”71
Subsequently, courts cited Continental Can with apparent approval
in anticipation cases through 1999,72 until the tide turned yet again.73
Toward the end of 1999, the Federal Circuit began chipping
away at the recognition requirement announced in Continental
Can.74 In Atlas Powder v. Ireco, Inc.,75 writing for a unanimous
panel of the court, Judge Rader opined, “Inherency is not necessarily
coterminous with the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art.
Artisans of ordinary skill may not recognize the inherent
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characteristics or functioning of the prior art.”76 Judge Rader went on
to explain that the purpose of § 102 is to ensure that a claimed
invention does not take something away from the public that is
already in its possession.77 Thus, it should be irrelevant “whether or
not [a PHOSITA] understand[s] [the prior art’s] complete makeup or
the underlying scientific principles which allow [it] to operate.”78
Atlas Powder did not uniformly reject the recognition
requirement; instead it explained that recognition was not probative
of inherency on that set of facts.79 Four years later, the panel in
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals80 uniformly rejected
recognition, in an attempt to return the law of inherency to its preContinental Can roots.81 However, the Federal Circuit declined to
restore full clarity to inherency by deciding the case en banc.82
Schering concerned a prior art patent for the antihistamine
loratadine—marketed by Schering as Claritin®—and a subsequent
patent granted to Schering for a metabolite of loratadine,
descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL).83 DCL formed naturally upon
human consumption and metabolization of loratadine, which was
patented more than one year before Schering filed their patent
application on DCL.84 Upon expiration of the loratadine patent,
Geneva Pharmaceuticals sought to enter the loratadine market.85
Schering filed suit alleging infringement of their DCL patent on the
ground that DCL forms upon consumption of loratadine.86 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Geneva, holding
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76. Id.
77. Id. at 1348 (“The public remains free to make, use, or sell prior art compositions or
processes, regardless of whether or not they understand their complete makeup or the underlying
scientific principles which allow them to operate. The doctrine of anticipation by inherency,
among other doctrines, enforces that basic principle.”).
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
81. Id. at 1377.
82. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (denying
rehearing en banc); see also id. at 993 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of petition for
rehearing en banc); id. at 995–96 (Lourie, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en
banc).
83. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1375.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1376.
86. Id.
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that the claims in the loratadine patent inherently anticipated the
DCL claims, which were therefore invalid.87
On appeal, the Federal Circuit began its opinion by boldly
asserting, “At the outset, this court rejects the contention that
inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”88
Interestingly, the Schering panel distinguished Continental Can
procedurally by characterizing Continental Can as merely vacating a
summary judgment grant based on conflicting testimony regarding
whether the claimed process was necessarily formed in the prior
art.89 In other words, Judge Newman’s language regarding
recognition was cloaked as mere dicta. Likewise, Tilghman and Eibel
were said to have involved a lack of evidence that the allegedly
inherent subject matter was present in the prior art—not the issue of
recognition.90 Accordingly, because Schering’s loratadine patent, the
pertinent prior art, disclosed administration of loratadine to people,
and the administration of loratadine to people inevitably produces
DCL, the loratadine patent inherently anticipated the DCL claim.91
3. In re Montgomery—The End of Inevitability?
On May 8, 2012, nearly a decade after deciding Schering, the
Federal Circuit decided In re Montgomery.92 There, Montgomery
filed an application for a method of use patent claiming the treatment
or prevention of stroke by administering ramipril, a renninangiotensin system (RAS) inhibitor, to stroke-prone patients.93 The
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87. Id.
88. Id. at 1377.
89. Id. (“In Continental Can, this court vacated summary judgment of anticipation of claims
reciting a plastic bottle with hollow ribs over a prior art reference disclosing a plastic bottle . . .
[because] [t]he record contained conflicting expert testimony about whether the ribs of the prior
art plastic bottle were solid.”).
90. Id. at 1378.
91. Id. at 1380.
92. 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
93. Id. at 1377. There were actually three claims at issue in In re Montgomery, which read as
follows:
42. A method for the treatment or prevention of stroke or its recurrence, wherein said
method comprises administering, to a patient diagnosed as in need of such treatment or
prevention, an inhibitor of the rennin-angiotensin system, said inhibitor having a Clog
P of greater than about 1.
43. The method as claimed in claim 42, wherein the inhibitor of the rennin-angiotensin
system comprises at least one inhibitor of angiotensin-converting enzyme.
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application was filed on April 25, 2005, claiming priority to United
Kingdom patent applications dated October 17, 1997, and May 20,
1998, respectively.94 The PTO examiner rejected Montgomery’s
claims as anticipated, and the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences affirmed the examiner’s rejection.95
Montgomery appealed the rejection to the Federal Circuit,
arguing that the prior art reference at issue in the appeal—a
publication describing the HOPE96 study—was merely a proposal for
future research and that the publication failed to enable a PHOSITA
to practice the claimed invention.97 HOPE was published in February
1996, more than one year before Montgomery’s priority date, and
describes the “design” of “a large, randomized clinical trial of the
efficacy of . . . ramipril, and of a naturally occurring antioxidant,
vitamin E, in reducing myocardial infarction (MI), stroke, or
[cardiovascular disease] death in over 9000 men and women at high
risk of CVD.”98
In other words, HOPE described a study that sought to test
whether or not a combination of ramipril and vitamin E would
reduce the risk of death from stroke and other cardiovascular
diseases in a random sample of patients.99 It provided no disclosure
that ramipril would reduce the risk of stroke death—effectively
leaving those who read it to speculate whether it would increase or
decrease that risk.100 HOPE even “provide[ed] specific criteria for
‘early termination’ if the proposed treatment [was] ineffective.”101
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45. The method as claimed in claim 43, wherein the inhibitor of angiotensin-converting
enzyme comprises ramipril.
Id. (emphasis omitted). Because the parties agreed that claim 45 incorporates claims 42 and 43,
the court only addressed claim 45. Id. at 1380 n.9.
94. Id. at 1376.
95. Id. at 1377–78.
96. HOPE is an acronym for Heart Outcomes Prevention Evaluation. The HOPE Study
Investigators, The HOPE (Heart Outcomes Prevention Evaluation) Study: The Design of a Large,
Simple Randomized Trial of an Angiotensin–Converting Enzyme Inhibitor (Ramipril) and Vitamin
E in Patients at High Risk of Cardiovascular Events, 12 CAN. J. CARDIOLOGY 127 (1996)
[hereinafter HOPE].
97. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1379.
98. Id. at 1378; HOPE, supra note 96, at 127.
99. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378.
100. Id. at 1381–83.
101. Id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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102. Brief for Appellant at 2–4, In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 111367), 2011 WL 454279, at *2–6 (reproducing the results of the AIRE study to demonstrate
ramipril increased the risk of stroke by 43 percent); The Acute Infarction Ramipril Efficacy
(AIRE) Study Investigators, Effect of Ramipril on Mortality and Morbidity of Survivors of Acute
Myocardial Infarction with Clinical Evidence of Heart Failure, 342 LANCET 821 (1993)
[hereinafter AIRE].
103. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 102, at 2–4 (reproducing the results of the AIRE
study to demonstrate ramipril increased the risk of stroke by 43 percent).
104. See The HOPE Study Investigators, Effects of an Angiotensin–Converting–Enzyme
Inhibitor, Ramipril, on Cardiovascular Events in High–Risk Patients, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED.
145, 148 tbl.3 (2000) [hereinafter HOPE II].
105. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378 (majority opinion); id. at 1385 (Lourie, J.,
dissenting).
106. Id. at 1383 (majority opinion).
107. See id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
108. Compare id. at 1381–83 (majority opinion), with id. at 1383–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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This exit strategy is significant, but not surprising. RAS
inhibitors, like ramipril, reduce hypertension yet, at the time, had
been shown to paradoxically increase stroke risk.102 In fact, AIRE,
one of the four studies cited by the Board in its rejection of
Montgomery’s claims, found that ramipril actually increased the risk
of stroke.103 In 2000, years after Montgomery’s priority date, the
authors of HOPE published the results of the study they described,
which found that administration of ramipril to stroke-prone patients
effectively decreased the risk of stroke-related deaths.104 However,
because the second HOPE reference was published years after
Montgomery’s priority date, the entire panel agreed it was
“irrelevant” to the anticipation analysis.105
A majority of the three-judge Federal Circuit panel rejected
Montgomery’s arguments and held that HOPE inherently anticipated
his claims.106 Judge Lourie, who had also dissented from the denial
of rehearing en banc in Schering, filed a dissenting opinion.107 The
entire panel agreed that HOPE did not expressly disclose effective
treatment or prevention of stroke, such that it could only anticipate
Montgomery’s claims inherently; it diverged, however, on whether
treatment of stroke was inevitable based on the HOPE reference and
on whether HOPE was enabling.108
The majority held that because “HOPE disclose[d] a protocol for
the administration of ramipril to stroke-prone patients, and
administering ramipril to stroke-prone patients inevitably treats or
prevents stroke,” HOPE inherently anticipated Montgomery’s
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109. Id. at 1381–82 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 1382 (citing Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
111. Id. (quoting Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
114. See id. 1383–84 (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711 (1880)). Judge Lourie
also dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc in Schering, along with Judge Newman. See
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); id. at 995–96 (Lourie, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for rehearing en banc).
115. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1384 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 1385.
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claims.109 Invoking strong language from Schering, the court
reminded the dissent that “anticipation ‘requires only an enabling
disclosure,’ not ‘actual creation or reduction to practice,’ so that
‘actual administration of [ramipril] to patients [in the prior art] is
irrelevant.’”110 The majority concluded by dismissing Judge Lourie’s
characterization of HOPE as a mere “invitation to investigate” that
was not enabling.111 To the majority, HOPE was “an advanced stage
of testing designed to secure regulatory approval.”112
Judge Lourie began his dissent by clearly delineating his side of
the inherency debate.113 He critiqued the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Schering and argued that, when properly understood, inherency is
“much more limited.”114 His dissent emphasized that HOPE
described no more than a design for a study that, at least to him, had
not actually been carried out, and thus could not have disclosed any
results whatsoever—let alone inevitable results. Additionally,
because it disclosed no results on efficacy, it also failed to enable a
PHOSITA to treat or prevent stroke.115 Judge Lourie argued that
HOPE was simply too indeterminate to be deemed inevitable.
Regardless of whether HOPE was an advanced stage of testing, it
was no more than the description of a study that required four years
of testing to produce data sufficient to demonstrate efficacy. In other
words, it was anything but inevitable.116 To that end, in order to find
inevitability, Judge Lourie argued that the majority reached outside
the scope of HOPE (and of the record in general) and relied on the
second HOPE disclosure, published years after Montgomery’s
priority date, to find inherency.117
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118. Id. at 1384.
119. See Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES.COM
(Feb. 10, 2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-trulystaggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/.
120. See id.
121. See De La Rosa, supra note 49.
122. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (2011).
123. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (2011) (codifying
Hatch-Waxman Act).
124. 35 U.S.C. § 156.
125. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 355. For further reading on the intricacies of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
see Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act,
the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417 (2011).
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III. INHERENCY, PREDICTABILITY, AND BRIGHT-LINE RULES
The importance of uniformity and predictability applies a
fortiori in industries where development costs are high, such as the
pharmaceutical industry.118 Taking into account the cost of failures,
one study suggests that the “average drug developed by a major
pharmaceutical company costs at least $4 billion, and it can be as
much as $11 billion.”119 Given that successful drugs can generate
billions of dollars in profits for their manufacturers, such costs can be
justifiable.120 Of course, this presupposes that manufacturers are
afforded a sufficiently uniform system of patent law from which to
predict whether their drug or medical device will be worthy of patent
protection.121 At the same time, the importance of encouraging
pharmaceutical research through ensuring predictable patent
protection must be balanced with the manifest interest of society in
receiving new and useful pharmaceuticals at cost-effective prices.122
Congress has already recognized the unique nature of
pharmaceutical patent protection.123 The Hatch-Waxman Act, passed
in 1984, allows pharmaceutical patents to be extended when delays
in obtaining FDA approval significantly reduce the amount of time
the patentee can exclusively market the patented pharmaceutical.124
This clearly promotes pharmaceutical research and development. The
Hatch-Waxman Act also allows generic drug manufacturers to begin
testing the patented pharmaceutical technology during the extended
time frame, which permits cost-effective generics to be marketed to
the public as soon as the patent term expires.125 Despite Congress’s
response to the unique nature of pharmaceutical patents, the Federal
Circuit’s inherency decisions treat complex pharmaceutical processes
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as if they involve the same kind of technology as any other
invention.
A. Predictability in Inherency
The last decade of precedent on inherent anticipation is anything
but predictable.126 Schering prompted significant dissention within
the Federal Circuit and the patent bar at large.127 In the decade since
Schering was decided, the intra-circuit battle over recognition
remains largely unsettled.128 The Federal Circuit has had the ability
to clarify the law of inherent anticipation in various cases, but it has
instead rejected opportunities to hear the cases en banc.129 Indeed, in
at least one instance, instead of clarifying the state of the law, the
Federal Circuit simply vacated a panel opinion requiring recognition
and remanded the underlying matter to the district court.130 Given
that this posture has more or less forced application of the Schering
articulation of the law, it is fair to say that Continental Can has been
rejected.131 However, some unpublished Federal Circuit opinions
continue to cite directly to Continental Can for the proposition that
inherency does require recognition, while the published opinions
continue to assert that recognition is not required, though not without
prompting dissents.132 Everyone deserves uniform protection, but the
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126. See, e.g., Haberman v. Gerber Prod. Co., 236 F. App’x 592, 598 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing
Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (not designated for
publication). See also In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Lourie, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing the inherency rule announced in Schering).
127. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); id. at 995–96 (Lourie, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling
Patent Law's Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1132 (2008); De La Rosa,
supra note 49, at 87.
128. See, e.g., Haberman, 236 F. App'x at 598 (citing Cont’l Can Co., 948 F.2d at 1268) (not
designated for publication). See also In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting)
(critiquing the inherency rule announced in Schering).
129. See, e.g., Schering, 348 F.3d at 992 (majority opinion) (denying petition for rehearing en
banc); Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (denying petition for rehearing en banc).
130. See Elan Pharm., 314 F.3d at 1299 (granting rehearing en banc, but declining to address
the issue in an en banc decision and instead simply vacating the panel opinion and remanding to
district court).
131. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1375 (rejecting recognition); SmithKline Beecham
Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting recognition).
132. Compare Haberman, 236 F. App’x at 598 (requiring recognition), with SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 403 F.3d at 1343 (rejecting recognition); Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339
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F.3d 1373, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting recognition). Cf. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383
(Lourie, J., dissenting) (critiquing the inherency rule announced in Schering).
133. No inherency case questions the inevitability requirement. See generally Schering, 339
F.3d at 1377 (“[A] prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of the claimed
invention if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single
anticipating reference.”); Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (requiring, in addition to recognition, that the pertinent evidence “make clear that the
missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described”).
134. See Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
135. Id.
136. See id.; In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 998–99 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (holding that the prior art
process did not anticipate the claims because the process would have produced at most one
billionth of a gram of the isotope in forty tons of radioactive material).
137. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1380.
138. 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
139. Id.
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Federal Circuit’s internal conflict concerning the nature of inherency
denies uniform, predictable patent protection—at least where the
dispute concerns recognition in an inherency analysis. Despite the
uncertainty and turmoil surrounding the post-Continental Can cases
rejecting recognition, at least one aspect of inherency law seemed
clear: inevitability is the touchstone of inherency.133
Before, and even after Schering, the Federal Circuit required
that the undisclosed, i.e., inherent, result flow with something
tantamount to statistical necessity from the operation as taught in the
prior art.134 For example, in the 1995 case Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm
Ltd.,135 the Federal Circuit refused to find that a prior art process
inherently anticipated a later claim directed at crystals—even though
the defendant’s experts reproduced the crystals using a prior art
process each of thirteen times—because the plaintiffs twice produced
different crystals using the same process.136 Schering was consistent
with Glaxo, insofar as the court found DCL formed naturally upon
human consumption of the prior art loratadine.137
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex,138 the Federal Circuit
arguably began to loosen the strict necessity requirement. However,
the holding is best understood as addressing the burden on the party
seeking to invalidate an issued patent.139 There, the district court
found in favor of SmithKline Beecham, the plaintiff-patentee suing
for infringement, because the defendant “did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it was impossible to make [a pure version
of the prior art compound with no trace elements of the allegedly
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140. Id. at 1343 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1344 (citing Schering, 339 F.3d at 1380).
143. Id.
144. See id.; Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (requiring, in addition to recognition, that the pertinent evidence “make clear that the
missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described”).
145. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
146. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1375; Schering, 339 F.3d at 1381; Cont’l Can Co.,
948 F.2d at 1268.
147. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1385.
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anticipated compound] in the United States before the critical date”
of the plaintiff’s patent.140 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
“[t]he district court erred in requiring Apotex to meet [that] standard
of proof, which [was] too exacting.”141 Instead, the court held that a
reference “suffices as an anticipatory prior art reference if it discloses
in an enabling manner” the production of the later-claimed
invention.142 Thus, because the prior art “disclose[d] a method . . .
that naturally results in the production of [the claimed compound],”
the court found the claimed compound was inherently anticipated by
the prior art.143 SmithKline Beecham is thus consistent with preSchering cases requiring strict necessity.144 However, in their 2012
decision in In re Montgomery, the Federal Circuit calls even
inevitability into question.145
Reading Continental Can, then Schering, followed by In re
Montgomery, would likely lead to confusion. This confusion is not
only because the recognition requirement from Continental Can was
rejected in Schering and would have foreclosed a finding of inherent
anticipation in In re Montgomery,146 but also because it is difficult to
square In re Montgomery with any prior cases on inherent
anticipation—it effectively eviscerated the requirement that the
inherent characteristics be “necessarily” present in the prior art
disclosure.147 Judge Lourie was correct when he said that nothing
properly before the court indicated that stroke treatment or
prevention was a necessary result of the process described in
HOPE.148 Prior to the fallout from Schering, and indeed even in
Schering, the Federal Circuit pointed to actual record evidence
establishing that the undisclosed result necessarily resulted from the
process in question with something resembling statistical
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necessity.149 In In re Montgomery, the Federal Circuit found
necessity by pointing to the mere description of a proposed study that
said absolutely nothing about whether ramipril would treat stroke.150
In essence, the majority found it sufficient to say that HOPE could
have been carried out, and if carried out it would have—or at least
should have—shown that ramipril possesses stroke-prevention
qualities.151 However, despite the majority’s belief, “could have,
would have, should have” is not the law: strict necessity is.152
The counterargument is that what Judge Lourie argues for in In
re Montgomery is no more than a disguised recognition requirement.
After all, the first step Judge Lourie took in his dissenting opinion
was to critique Schering for the overly broad conception of inherency
it produced.153 In other words, to require inevitability be shown
contemporaneously requires record evidence that would
independently satisfy the recognition requirement.154 But Judge
Lourie did not demand something tantamount to recognition without
having a reasonable basis for doing so.155 Indeed, even ignoring
Schering and Continental Can, there is an argument that Supreme
Court precedent from Tilghman and Eibel requires something
resembling recognition—at least in certain instances. The Supreme
Court rested its holdings in both Tilghman and Eibel, at least in part,
on the fact that the records lacked evidence establishing that the prior
art actually employed the newly patented techniques.156 That is, the
records did not establish that the prior art necessarily contained the
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149. See, e.g., Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
150. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378; see also id. at 1384 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (“As the
majority acknowledges, the references do not expressly disclose this claimed method. Nor is the
claimed method an inherent result of carrying out what the references describe.”).
151. Compare id. at 1382–83 (majority opinion) (arguing “even if HOPE merely proposed the
administration of Ramipril for treatment or prevention of stroke (without actually doing so), it
would still anticipate”), with id. at 1385 (Lourie, J. dissenting) (“[A] mere description of a
process that, if it had been carried out, might yield a particular undisclosed result is not an
inherent anticipation of that result.”) (emphasis omitted).
152. See Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939) (“Inherency . . . may not
be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from
a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”).
153. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383–84 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 1382–83 (majority opinion).
155. See id. at 1383–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711
(1880)).
156. Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Tilghman, 102
U.S. 707.
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157. Eibel, 261 U.S. at 45.
158. Id. at 66 (emphasis added) (citing Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711).
159. Compare Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(distinguishing Tilghman and Eibel as “accidental” anticipation cases involving a lack of
evidence establishing inevitability), with In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383–84 (Lourie, J.,
dissenting) (citing Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711) (“Properly understood [under Tilghman],
anticipation by inherency is far more limited.”).
160. While requiring contemporaneous evidence of inevitability is essentially the same as
requiring that a PHOSITA would have, or should have, recognized the undisclosed characteristics
in the prior art, to require a sufficiently “definite” showing of inevitability based on the prior art
disclosure is not at all tantamount to recognition.
161. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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later claimed invention.157 However, the Court did state, as a second
ground, that “accidental results” which are “not intended and not
appreciated” cannot constitute anticipation.158 Whether the Court
meant to include a “per se” requirement that a PHOSITA
appreciate—i.e., recognize—the undisclosed characteristic is open to
debate. Indeed, as cases like Atlas Powder and Schering make clear,
the Federal Circuit continues to vigorously debate the meaning and
significance of the Court’s holdings in Tilghman and Eibel; the
judges are not in agreement.159
Disagreement over “per se” recognition notwithstanding, in a
situation like the one presented in In re Montgomery, there is a
significantly large gap between requiring contemporaneous
recognition and demanding a showing of inevitability that adequately
protects the investment of the patent applicant.160
HOPE described a massive, complicated, long-term study of the
efficacy of ramipril in treating or preventing a number of
cardiovascular diseases.161 The fact that it took the HOPE authors
roughly four years to publish the results of their proposed study is
informative: the outcome of the study was anything but
preordained.162 In fact, the exact study described in the HOPE
publication never happened.163 The authors had to alter the study to
account for lag time, meaning the study used by the majority to
invalidate Montgomery’s claims was never carried out.164
Consequently, HOPE, as described before Montgomery’s priority
date, was no more than an aspiration; it was, as its name suggests,
only a “hope.”
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165. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 102, at 2–4 (reproducing the results of the AIRE
study to demonstrate ramipril increased the risk of stroke by 43 percent, or at minimum had no
effect on stroke prevention).
166. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1381 n.11 (majority opinion).
167. See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966) (“[K]nown disadvantages in old
devices which would naturally discourage the search for new inventions may be taken into
account in determining obviousness.”); W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540,
1550–51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (the totality of a reference's teachings must be considered in an
obviousness analysis). See also In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing the
relationship between a prima facie face of obviousness and teaching away as a secondary
consideration capable of rebutting a prima facie showing of obviousness).
168. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
169. See In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378; id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Newman, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 190 Side B

Moreover, though the appellate record in In re Montgomery was
silent on the results of the HOPE study, the record contained
evidence from the AIRE study indicating that ramipril could actually
increase the likelihood of stroke, or at the very least, had no relevant
effect on stroke.165 The PTO examiner, the Board, and the majority
of the Federal Circuit dismissed this data as irrelevant by arguing
that evidence of “teaching away” is limited to an obviousness
analysis under § 103.166 Teaching away is, no doubt, an obviousness
consideration.167 But how does a process “necessarily” produce a
given result if multiple results are possible? Logically, prior
precedent in cases such as Glaxo held that it could not.168 In In re
Montgomery, the prior art is no more than the description of a study
that disclosed absolutely nothing regarding efficacy, included
specific criteria for early termination, and—insofar as it was
modified after publication—was never realized.169 “Inherency
follows from the carrying out of an activity that inherently produces
what is claimed; [it] does not arise from a plan whose description
does not indicate its realization.”170
In re Montgomery thus departs from prior cases on inherency,
not only by finding necessity despite evidence that the undisclosed
characteristics were not always produced by the prior art but also by
finding necessity through the mere design of a study that was never
carried out.171 If inherency can be established through prior art as
indeterminate as a description of a proposed study, the scope of
inherent anticipation is dangerously boundless.172 Indeed, “every
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biological property is the natural and inherent result of the chemical
structure from which it arises.”173 Thus, under the law of inherency
as announced in In re Montgomery, the mere recitation of a process
involving a prior art compound, with essentially no enabling
disclosure, is sufficient to negate a later patent directed at that
process, regardless of whether the prior art disclosed efficacy or was
intended to cure the ailment at issue.174
Predictability is always important in law, but uncertainty is
particularly problematic in the pharmaceutical context.175 Given the
staggering cost of pharmaceutical research and development,
pharmaceutical companies need to have a clear understanding of
what will anticipate and what will not, so as to invest prudently.176
Moreover, while there are various types of litigation insurance a
company can take out to protect against unanticipated changes in the
law, there is no insurance that can ameliorate the negative
consequences of a patent being invalidated due to shifting
articulation of the law.177
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173. Id.
174. See id.; see also In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1378–83 (invalidating patent as
inherently anticipated even where prior art did not disclose efficacy).
175. E.g., Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383-84 (Lourie, J, dissenting). .
176. See supra Part II.
177. See generally Insurance Coverage, A.B.A. (Jan. 17, 2003), http://apps.americanbar.org
/litigation/committees/insurance/ (discussing litigation insurance coverage). Intellectual property
insurance generally comes in two forms: (1) “defensive” insurance that allows companies to
insure their assets against future infringement claims, and (2) “offensive” insurance—known as
abatement insurance—for companies seeking to bolster their ability to enforce their intellectual
property rights. Ian McClure, Intellectual Property Insurance: Transforming the Economic Model
for IP Litigation, 57 FED. LAW. 18, 18 (2010). Of course, these forms of insurance cover the costs
of litigating patent infringement; they do not indemnify a patent holder against future losses that
stem from an inability to enforce patent rights subsequent to a finding of patent invalidity. Id.
178. See Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting); Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco,
Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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B. Bright-Line Rules are Often Inadequate at Protecting the Policy
Interests at Stake in Patent Law
The purpose of § 102 is to ensure that a claimed invention does
not take something away from the public that was already in their
possession.178 To that end, it is consistent with the public policy
behind patent law for a prior art publication to anticipate without
expressly disclosing all limiting characteristics of the later claimed
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invention, even where no one recognizes the undisclosed result.179
Indeed, there is no language in § 102 that discusses recognition or
even inevitability.180 Rather, both are judicial creations that seek an
appropriate balance—ensuring that subject matter already within the
public domain is not later taken away from the public on the one
hand, and fostering scientific research and development through
patent grants on the other.181
In the early shift away from Continental Can’s bright-line
recognition requirement in Atlas Power, Judge Rader’s assertion that
inherency and recognition are not necessarily coterminous accurately
summarizes the relationship between public disclosure and the patent
policy of promoting scientific progress.182 Judge Rader’s opinion in
Atlas Powder acknowledges that there are times when recognition is
not relevant to an anticipation analysis, such as patents involving
compositions of matter.183 These patents are different because a
patent on a composition of matter provides the patentee with the
exclusive right to exclude all uses of the composition.184 This holds
true in Schering, where DCL, the metabolite of loratadine, formed
upon human metabolization of loratadine.185 DCL is a composition
of matter; thus, a patent on DCL carries with it the right to exclude
the public from using DCL in any form, including the use of
loratadine, given that DCL necessarily forms upon consumption of
loratadine.186
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179. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Atlas Powder, 190
F.3d at 1347.
180. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
181. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
182. See Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 1347.
183. Id.
184. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (listing composition of matter as patentable subject matter);
§ 271(a) (providing remedy for infringement).
185. Schering, 339 F.3d at 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
186. This was the very premise of Schering’s infringement action against Geneva, i.e., that
use of loratadine necessarily leads to production of the metabolite DCL. Id. Indeed, Judge
Newman’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Schering implies that the majority was
overly concerned with the issue of infringement and whether it would be equitable to permit
infringement in the situation presented in Schering. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc.,
348 F.3d 992, 993–94 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Newman believes the panel reached the appropriate
result—that is, a finding of no liability—but that they took the wrong steps and muddled the law
of inherency to arrive there. Id. Instead of deciding the case on infringement grounds, which may
or may not have required the crafting of an exception of some sort, Newman argues the panel
misapplied inherency law to invalidate the patent. See id. (“[I]nstead of simply ruling that
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Schering cannot prevent the practice of the expired patent in accordance with its teachings, the
panel strains to hold that this newly discovered, previously unknown product cannot be validly
patented. That is not the law. [Newman] also point[ed] out that the issue here is validity, not
infringement.”).
187. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (“Direct
infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every step or element of a claimed
method or product.”); see also id. at 1379 (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773
(Fed. Cir. 1993)) (“For process patent or method patent claims, infringement occurs when a party
performs all of the steps of the process.”).
188. Montgomery’s claims only involved a method of administering ramipril to stroke prone
patients. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also U.S. Patent No.
20,050,192,326 (filed Apr. 29, 2005) (Montgomery’s patent application). He did not, and could
not have, claimed exclusive rights in the compound ramipril.
189. Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1383–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1378 n.8 (majority opinion); see also HOPE II, supra note 104, at 148 tbl.3
(publishing results of the HOPE study).
191. See Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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Conversely, a method of use patent, such as the one at issue in
In re Montgomery, applies only to a particularized, i.e., problem
specific, process; that process must be carried out in full for
infringement liability to attach.187 The claims at issue in In re
Montgomery only involved application of ramipril for stroke
treatment, and would not remove ramipril from the public domain in
the same manner that Schering’s DCL patent did. Even if
Montgomery’s patent issued, ramipril could be used to treat
hypertension, as it had been used before Montgomery’s patent
application or the HOPE study.188
At least with respect to method of use patents in the
pharmaceutical context, recognition seems to play some indirect role
in deciding whether the public actually possessed the inherent
characteristic of efficacy, whether the disclosure was enabling, and
whether the undisclosed result was inevitable based on the prior
art.189 There is little question that ramipril does effectively treat
stroke,190 but the primary concern in In re Montgomery was whether
HOPE inherently disclosed that effective treatment before
Montgomery’s patent application. If no one—including the HOPE
authors—recognized the stroke-preventing characteristics of
ramipril, can the public really be said to “possess” this knowledge in
the same way they possessed the DCL compound? A PHOSITA was
not put on notice that ramipril treats stroke based on the HOPE
disclosure’s description of a proposed research study.191 Therefore,
although a per se recognition requirement is unnecessary, the concept
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E.g., inevitability, enablement, and the policy germane to inherency.
See, e.g., Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1385–86 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1381–83 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1381 n.11.
Cf. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1381.
See id. at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1383 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1383–84 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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of recognition should play some role in informing the otherwise
relevant inherency inquiries,192 at least in pharmaceutical patent
cases.193 Yet the majority of the Federal Circuit’s categorical
rejection of recognition, and anything that resembles recognition,
forecloses the ability to pursue this seemingly inescapable overlap.194
Inherency is further obfuscated by the In re Montgomery
majority’s rejection of the argument that the AIRE study foreclosed a
finding of inevitability. AIRE was published just before HOPE and
found that ramipril either increased stroke risk or had no meaningful
effect on stroke prevention.195 This seems to indicate that the natural
result of the operation as taught was not necessarily treatment or
prevention of stroke.196 The majority in In re Montgomery was so
quick to resort to a bright line rejection of “teaching away” as a
consideration limited to obviousness that it failed to consider the
implications on the question of inevitability.197 It seems questionable
that an undisclosed result can be said to “necessarily” flow from a
publication describing a proposed study that took no position on its
outcome, was modified after publication, and did not produce results
for nearly a half decade.198 But it is entirely implausible that an
undisclosed result necessarily flows from such a disclosure when a
similar process, carried out beforehand, produced contradictory
results.199 Despite these shortcomings, the majority of the Federal
Circuit panel in In re Montgomery found inherency.200
If the Federal Circuit’s precedent on inherent anticipation
teaches us anything, it is that rigid, bright-line rules fail to adequately
address the public policy goals of patent law.201 By focusing the
inherency analysis on bright-line definitions of inevitability and
enablement and by categorically rejecting recognition, the Federal
Circuit’s recent inherency cases produce results that are not only
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unpredictable but also questionable in light of the patent policy at
issue.202
The Supreme Court has previously highlighted the
ineffectiveness of bright-line rules in another area of patent law.203 In
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,204 the Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s bright-line test for obviousness finding “[r]igid
preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common
sense . . . [are] neither necessary under . . . nor consistent with” the
Court’s precedent.205 Instead of supporting a bright-line rule, the
Supreme Court instructed the Federal Circuit to apply an “expansive
and flexible approach” to the question of obviousness.206 Despite
announcing this “common sense” approach to obviousness, the Court
was sure to underscore the fact that its precedent “recognized the
need for ‘uniformity and definiteness’” in patent law matters.207
However, because obviousness—like inherency—applies to the
entire gambit of patentable subject matter, the Court found that a
“functional approach” to obviousness was the appropriate choice.208
An expansive and flexible approach to the question of inherency is
equally necessary, especially in the context of pharmaceutical
patents, given Congress’s unique treatment of pharmaceuticals under
Hatch-Waxman.209
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202. See id.
203. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 421.
206. Id. at 415–16.
207. Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966)).
208. Id. (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850)).
209. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (2004) (Hatch-Waxman patent term restoration). See also De
La Rosa, supra note 49, at 83 (arguing Hatch-Waxman demonstrates that Congress recognizes the
uniqueness of pharmaceutical patents and consequently that Congress should address the
troubling consequences of inherency cases like Schering and SmithKline Beecham in order to
allow pharmaceutical companies to maximize the value of their research and development).
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IV. A FLEXIBLE, COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO INHERENCY
To resolve the lack of predictability in inherent anticipation once
and for all, the Federal Circuit needs to do what it could have done
decades ago after Continental Can was decided: take an inherent
anticipation case en banc and set forth a clear standard for inherent

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 193 Side B

09/23/2014 13:40:53

UNBOUND CONCEPTION OF INHERENCY

374

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

9/12/2014 6:48 PM

[Vol. 47:345

anticipation so as to dispel confusion and properly bind the court.210
Presently, given that a three-judge Federal Circuit panel cannot
overrule any other panel’s decision, earlier inherency decisions
technically remain good law alongside the conflicting opinions in
cases such as In re Montgomery.211 The need for clarification and
establishment of a solid foundation en banc thus cannot be
overstated.212 In announcing its definitive inherency decision en
banc, the Federal Circuit need not adopt a “new” rule.213 Instead, the
Federal Circuit should align the inherency test with the obviousness
analysis mandated by the Supreme Court in KRS International Co.214
By taking an “expansive and flexible” approach to inherent
anticipation, more complicated technology will not fall prey to
bright-line rules, which might be appropriately applied to less

09/23/2014 13:40:53
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210. In addition to calling for en banc consideration of the issue, there is a possibility that the
scope of inherency could be made clear through a grant of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923);
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). In fact, Montgomery filed a petition for certiorari on
August 6, 2012. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 2012
WL 3229399 (U.S. Aug. 6, 2012) (No. 12-182). However, the Court denied the petition for
certiorari on December 10, 2012, foreclosing any chance for additional review in In re
Montgomery. 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 788 (2012).
211. Only en banc consideration of an issue permits the Federal Circuit to repudiate prior
panel decisions. In the Federal Circuit’s first case, South Corp. v. United States, the court, sitting
en banc, adopted all the prior precedent of the Court of Claims and the CCPA. 690 F.2d 1368,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). The court noted it had the right to overrule any prior CCPA
precedents, as well as any panel decisions that were later deemed improper, through en banc
consideration. Id. at 1370 n.2.
212. The Federal Circuit has recognized the importance of en banc hearings. A recent en banc
decision cites Justice Scalia, who in a 1998 letter to the Commission on Structural Alternatives
for the Federal Courts of Appeals, wrote: “[T]he function of en banc hearings . . . is not only to
eliminate intra-circuit conflicts, but also to correct and deter panel opinions that are pretty clearly
wrong . . . . The disproportionate segment of [the Supreme Court's] discretionary docket that is
consistently devoted to reviewing [a regional court of appeals'] judgments, and to reversing them
by lopsided margins, suggests that this error-reduction function is not being performed
effectively. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 72 (1999) (letter dated Aug. 21, 1998)).
213. The Federal Circuit may well disagree with the proposal set forth herein, but that does
not change the need for reconsideration en banc or the fact that their present case law is
questionable in light of the patent policy inherency is meant to foster. Though this Note takes the
position that some post-Schering cases have been decided contrary to the patent policy behind
inherency, another critical issue is that of inadequate guidance, i.e., predictability. The Federal
Circuit can still rectify the inconsistencies of prior panel decisions, and properly bind the minority
of the circuit that continues to adhere to pre-Schering cases, by taking a case en banc and
announcing a rule of law consistent with the holding in Schering.
214. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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215. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re
Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
216. See, e.g., In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1379–80 (majority opinion) (discussing the
facts necessary to establish anticipation through inherency).
217. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
218. Id.
219. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
220. Compare id. (discussing purpose of inherency), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (discussing the
novelty requirement and setting forth the statutory basis for anticipation).
221. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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complex inventions. A “common sense” approach also has the added
benefit of allowing for constant adaptation to the current state of
science and the arts. Finally, by avoiding a bright-line requirement
that inherency cannot ever be X, or that it must always involve Y, the
court is better equipped to focus on the proper goal of inherency—
protecting that which is already in the public domain from being
wrenched away from the public by a patent.215
Under the “common sense” approach to inherency, the court
would still ask whether the undisclosed result is inevitably present,
or inherent, in the prior art and whether the prior art enabled a
PHOSITA to practice the later claimed invention.216 But in
answering the question of inevitability, the court should be mindful
of the purpose of § 102 and the system of patent protection
generally.217 Approached from this angle, the need for recourse to
common-sense concepts such as recognition would not be denied
when necessary to determine the extent to which the prior art
inherently discloses, and therefore anticipates, later patent claims.
There is no language in § 102 requiring either inevitability or
enablement.218 Rather, inevitability and enablement are judicial
creations that seek to ensure that subject matter previously disclosed
is not later removed from the public domain through a patent
grant.219 Thus, the common-sense approach to inherency in no way
upsets the intent of Congress; to the contrary, it advances it by
promoting the policy underlying the Patent Act, instead of focusing
exclusively on judicially created concepts not expressly set forth in
the statute.220
If the common-sense approach were applied to the facts of
Schering, the outcome would be the same. The compound DCL was
placed within the public domain by Schering’s loratadine patent
because it formed naturally upon human metabolization.221 DCL
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exists as a necessary part of loratadine, and even more importantly,
Schering’s prior art patent on loratadine disclosed the efficacy of
administration of loratadine and administration to humans.222
Conversely, if the common sense test for inherency were applied
in In re Montgomery, it would be clear that the majority erred in
finding that HOPE anticipated Montgomery’s claims. HOPE did not
inform the public that ramipril administration to stroke-prone
patients decreased the risk of stroke.223 No cardiologist could have
prescribed ramipril to treat stroke based on HOPE’s proposed tests of
ramipril, nor would a PHOSITA have been placed on notice of the
fact that ramipril treats or prevents stroke. For that, the HOPE
authors asked the public to wait another four years.224 Meanwhile,
when Montgomery filed his patent application, he disclosed that
ramipril does, in fact, treat or prevent stroke,225 and he bestowed
upon the public something heretofore unknown—something novel. It
follows that Montgomery’s claims would not have been found
invalid by inherency under the common-sense approach.
The common-sense approach to inherency is, by definition, not a
strict, bright-line rule that can be readily applied with minimal effort.
Rather, the utility of this approach is its ability to take into account
the multifaceted nature of the technology covered by U.S. patent law
so as to ensure “uniformity and definiteness”226 without sacrificing
the balance in patent policy concerning novelty, public disclosure,
and inventorship.
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222. Id.
223. In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Lourie, J., dissenting).
224. Id.
225. As discussed supra, Montgomery’s patent specification disclosed effective treatment or
prevention of stroke by administering ramipril to stroke-prone patients. See id. at 1377 (majority
opinion).
226. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (citing Graham v. John Deere
Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966)).
227. Compare Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(requiring recognition), and Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
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V. CONCLUSION
Predictability is among the most essential criterion of U.S.
patent law. However, recent Federal Circuit decisions on inherent
anticipation lack uniformity and predictability and, therefore,
undermine the predictability of our patent system.227 The need to
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clarify the law of inherency en banc is thus of critical importance.
While any clarification would help return patent law to some level of
stability, the “common sense” approach proposed in this Note is
specifically designed to maximize predictability while also
promoting patent policy.
As it stands, the Federal Circuit’s conception of inherency is so
vast that applications of drugs for purposes that were never before
envisioned are patent ineligible, simply because the drug was later
discovered to effectively treat that ailment.228 The purpose of patent
law is to promote the advancement of science and the useful arts,229
but the current law of inherency encourages only new growth, not
improvements.230 Indeed, if claims like Montgomery’s, which build
off of and improve previously patented subject matter, are invalid
under the doctrine of inherency, the pharmaceutical industry is given
little incentive to continue researching and developing the
effectiveness of previously patented pharmaceuticals.231 When
pharmaceuticals like ramipril can help prevent stroke-related death,
but such characteristics were unknown at the time of patenting, it
makes little sense to say that the person who discovered the
previously unknown quality is less deserving of patent protection
than the initial inventor, who knew nothing of the additional
characteristics.232 Moreover, given the recent “bad drug” mass tort
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(demanding that the prior art produce the later claimed invention each and every time it is
performed to find inherent anticipation), with Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting recognition), and In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375 (finding inherency
despite evidence that the claimed method produced contradictory results).
228. See, e.g., In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1377–83.
229. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
230. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
231. For example, Montgomery was seeking to expand our knowledge of the efficacy of
ramipril, yet, under the current doctrine of inherency, his patent was invalidated, providing him—
and the rest of the industry—no incentive to engage in similar conduct in the future. See In re
Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1377–83 (invalidating method of use patent involving administration of
previously patented compound as inherently anticipated).
232. See id. at 1383–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting); see generally Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. &
Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 66 (1923) (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711 (1880))
(“[I]f [the prior art] had [brought about the result sought by the patent applicant] under unusual
conditions, accidental results, not intended and not appreciated, do not constitute anticipation.”).
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cases, public policy clearly favors encouraging additional research
and development on patented pharmaceuticals.233
The common-sense approach to inherency seeks to promote
patent policy and protect both inventors and the public. At the same
time, by requiring the court to focus on the purpose of § 102, instead
of simply allowing discussion of the words long ago imposed to
address that same purpose, the common-sense approach seeks to
restore uniformity and predictability to the doctrine of inherency, and
to patent law as a whole.
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233. One such example is the Vioxx litigation. See, e.g., Duff Wilson, Merck to Pay $950
Million Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/business
/merck-agrees-to-pay-950-million-in-vioxx-case.html?_r=0. This is not to imply that Merck did
not continue testing Vioxx, but in light of the fact that even drugs that receive FDA approval can
turn out to be dangerous, public policy certainly favors laws encouraging additional research on
previously patented drugs that are already being marketed for other purposes. Cf. In re
Montgomery, 677 F.3d at 1377–85 (invalidating method of use patent involving administration of
previously patented compound to treat or prevent stroke as inherently anticipated, even where no
prior art reference indicated the method of use effectively treated or prevented stroke).

